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1. Introduction 
 
It is a great honor to present the Alfred Marshall lecture.
1  For half a century or 
more after the publication of his Principles (1890), it was routinely asserted of economic 
ideas that “they're all in Marshall”.  Of course, that is no longer true of the theory itself. 
But Marshall was also very concerned with applying economics, and when we think 
about how to use the theory, the example that Marshall set still remains a valuable guide. 
Today, therefore, I want to use some of Marshall’s views, and my own experience in 
auction design, to discuss the use (and abuse) of economic theory.  
 
Although the most elegant mathematical theory is often the most influential, it 
may not be the most useful for practical problems.  Marshall (1906) famously stated that 
“a good mathematical theorem dealing with economic hypotheses [is] very unlikely to be 
good economics”, and continued by asserting the rules “(1) Translate [mathematics] into 
English; (2) Then illustrate by examples that are important in real life; (3) Burn the 
mathematics; (4) If you can’t succeed in 2, burn 1”!  Certainly this view now seems 
extreme, but it is salutary to be reminded that good mathematics need not necessarily be 
good economics. To slightly update Marshall's rules, if we can't ( 1) offer credible 
intuition and (2) supply empirical (or perhaps case-study or experimental) evidence, we 
should (4) be cautious about applying the theory in practice.
2  
 
Furthermore, when economics is applied to policy, proposals need to be robust to 
the political context in which they are intended to operate. Too many economists excuse 
their practical failure by saying “the politicians (or bureaucrats) didn't do exactly what I 
recommended”. Just as medical practitioners must allow for the fact that their patients 
may not take all the pills they prescribe, or follow all the advice they are given, so 
economics practitioners need to foresee political and administrative pressures and make 
their plans robust to changes that politicians, bureaucrats, and lobbyists are likely to 
impose. And in framing proposals, economists must recognize that policies that seem 
                                                                 
1 This is the text of the 2002 Alfred Marshall Lecture of the European Economic Association, given at its 
Annual Congress, in Venice. 
I gave a similar lecture at the 2002 Colin Clark Lecture of the Econometric Society, presented to 
its Annual Australasian Meeting.  Like Marshall, Clark was very involved in practical economic policy 
making. He stressed the importance of quantification of empirical facts which, I argue below, is often 
underemphasized by modern economic theorists. 
Similar material also formed the core of the biennial 2002 Lim Tay Boh Lecture in Singapore.  
Lim was another very distinguished economist (and Vice-Chancellor of the National University of 
Singapore), who also made significant contributions to policy, as an advisor to the Singapore Government. 
Finally, some of these ideas were presented in the Keynote Address to the 2002 Portuguese 
Economic Association's 2002 meetings. 
I am very grateful to all those audiences for helpful comments. 
2 I mean cautious about the theory.  Not dismissive of it.  And  (3) seems a self-evident mistake, if only 
because of the need for efficient communication among, and education of, economists, let alone the 
possibilities for further useful development of the mathematics.    
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identical, or almost identical, to them may seem very different to politicians, and vice 
versa. 
 
Some academics also need to widen the scope of their analyses beyond the 
confines of their models which, while elegant, are often short on real-world detail.  
Marshall always emphasised the importance of a deep “historical knowledge of any area 
being investigated and referred again and again to the complexity of economic problems 
and the naivety of simple hypotheses.”
3  Employing “know it all” consultants with 
narrowly-focused theories instead of experienced people with a good knowledge of the 
wider context can sometimes lead to disaster. 
 
One might think these lessons scarcely needed stating – and Marshall certainly 
understood them very well – but the sorry history of “expert” advice in some recent 
auctions shows that they bear repetition.  So although the lessons are general ones,  I will 
illustrate them using auctions and auction theory: Auction theory is often held up as a 
triumph of the application of economic theory to economic practice, but it has not, in 
truth, been an unalloyed success.  For example, while the European and Asian 3G 
spectrum auctions famously raised over 100 billion euros in total revenues, Hong Kong's, 
Austria's, the Netherlands', and Switzerland's auctions were catastrophically badly run 
yielding only a quarter or less of the per capita revenues earned elsewhere  – and 
economic  theorists deserve some of the blame.
4, 
5  Other countries' auctions worked 
through good luck rather than good design, while bidders advised by so-called experts in 
auction theory pursued strategies that cost them billions of euros.  Many of these failures 
could have been avoided if the lessons had been learnt: pay more attention to elementary 
theory, to the wider context of the auctions, and to political pressures - and pay less 
attention to sophisticated mathematical theory.
6 
 
                                                                 
3 Sills (1968) p.28. An attractively written appreciation of Marshall and his work is in Keynes (1933). 
4 We take the governments’ desire for high revenue as given, and ask how well the auctions met this 
objective.  While an efficient allocation of licences was most governments’ first priority, there is no clear 
evidence of any differences between the efficiencies of different countries’ allocations, so revenues were 
seen as the measure of success.  (Binmore and Klemperer (2002, Section 2 ) argues governments were 
correct to make revenue a priority because of the substantial deadweight losses of raising government funds 
by alternative means, and because the revenues were one-time sunk costs for firms so should be expected to 
have only limited effects on firms’ subsequent investment and pricing behavior.) 
5 The six European auctions i n year 2000 yielded 100 (Austria), 615 (Germany), 240 (Italy), 170 
(Netherlands), 20 (Switzerland), and 650 (UK) euros per capita for very similar properties. True, valuations 
fell during the year as the stockmarkets also fell, but Klemperer (2002a) details a variety of evidence that 
valuations ranged from 300-700 euros per capita in all of these auctions.  Klemperer (2002a) gives a full 
description of all nine west European 3G auctions. 
6 Another topical example of overemphasis on sophisticated theory at the expense of elementary theory is 
European merger policy’s heavy focus on the ‘coordinated’ effects that may be facilitated by a merger (and 
about which we have learnt from repeated game theory) and, at the time of writing, relative lack of concern 
about  the more straightforward ‘unilateral’ effects of mergers (which can be understood using much 
simpler static game theory).  (As a Member of the U.K. Competition Commission, I stress that this 
criticism does not apply to U.K. policy!)  
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Of course, mathematical theory, even when it has no direct practical application, 
is not merely beautiful. It can clarify the central features of a problem, provide useful 
benchmarks and starting points for analysis and  – especially  – show the deep 
relationships between problems that are superficially unconnected. Thus, for example, the 
sophisticated tools of auction theory that have sometimes been abused in practical 
contexts turn out to have valuable applications to problems that, at first blush, do not look 
like auctions.  
 
            Section 2 briefly discusses what is often taken to be the “standard auction theory”, 
before discussing its real relevance. Sections 3-5 illustrate its abuse using examples from 
the Asian and European 3G auctions, and discuss the broader lessons that can be drawn 
from these misapplications.  Section 3 is in large part based on Klemperer (2000b, 2002a-
e) where many additional details can be found — and this section may be skipped by 
readers familiar with that material — but the other sections make different points using 
additional examples.  Section 6 illustrates how the same concepts that are abused can 
have surprisingly valuable uses in different contexts.  Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2. The Received Auction Theory 
 
The core result that everyone who studies auction theory learns is the remarkable 
Revenue Equivalence Theorem (RET).
7  This tells us, subject to some reasonable- 
sounding conditions, that all the standard (and many non-standard) auction mechanisms 
are equally profitable for the seller, and that buyers are also indifferent between all these 
mechanisms. 
 
If that were all there was to it, auction design would be of no interest.  But of 
course the RET rests on a number of assumptions. Probably the most influential piece of 
auction theory apart from the RET is Milgrom and Weber's (1982) remarkable paper – it 
is surely no coincidence that this is also perhaps the most elegant piece of auction theory 
apart from those associated with the RET. Milgrom and Weber’s seminal analysis relaxes 
the assumption that bidders have independent private information about the value of the 
object for sale, and instead assumes bidders' private information is affiliated. This is 
                                                                 
7 The RET is due in an early form to Vickrey (1961), and in its full glory to Myerson (1981), Riley and 
Samuelson (1981), and others. A typical statement is “Assume each of a given number of risk-neutral 
potential buyers has a privately-known signal about the value of an object, independently drawn from a 
common, strictly increasing, atomless distribution. Then any auction mechanism in which (i) the object 
always goes to the buyer with the highest signal, and (ii) any bidder with the lowest feasible signal expects 
zero surplus, y ields the same expected revenue (and results in each bidder making the same expected 
payment as a function of her signal).” 
Klemperer (1999) gives an elementary introduction to auction theory, including a simple 
exposition, and further discussion, of the RET.  
  4 
similar to assuming positive correlation,
8 and under this assumption they show that 
ordinary ascending auctions are more profitable than standard (first-price) sealed-bid 
auctions, in expectation. 
 
Milgrom and Weber's beautiful work is undoubtedly an important piece of 
economic theory and it has been enormously influential.
9  As a result, many economists 
leave graduate school “knowing” two things about auctions.  First, that if bidders' 
information is independent then all auctions are equally good, and second, that if 
information is affiliated (which is generally the plausible case) then the ascending auction 
maximises the seller's revenue.
10  
 
But is this correct? 
 
Relevance of the Received Theory 
 
Marshall's (updated) tests are a good place to start.   The value of empirical 
evidence needs no defense, while examining the plausibility of an intuition helps check 
whether an economic model provides a useful caricature of the real world, or misleads us 
by absurdly exaggerating particular features of it.
11  
 
The intuition behind the exact RET result cannot, to my knowledge, be explained 
in words that are both accurate and comprehensible to lay people.  Anyone with the 
technical skill to understand any verbal explanation would probably do so by translating 
the words back into the mathematical argument. But it is easier to defend the weaker 
claim that it is ambiguous which of the two most common auction forms is superior: it is 
easy to explain that participants in a sealed-bid auction shade their bids below their 
values (unlike in an ascending auction), but that the winner determines the price (unlike 
in an ascending auction), so it is not hard to be convincing that there is no clear reason 
why either auction should be more profitable than the other.  This is not quite the same as 
arguing that the standard auction forms are approximately similarly profitable, but the 
approximate validity of the RET (under its key assumptions) in fact seems consistent 
with the available evidence.  (Some would say that the mere fact that both the ascending 
auction and the sealed-bid auction are commonly observed in practice is evidence that 
neither is always superior.)  So the “approximate RET” seems a reasonable claim in 
                                                                 
8 It is actually a stronger assumption, but it is probably typically approximately satisfied. 
9 Not only is the concept of affiliation important in applications well beyond auction theory (see section 6)  
but this paper was also critical to the development of auction theory, in that it introduced and analysed a 
general model including both private and common value components. 
10 Or, to take just one very typical example from a current academic article “The one useful thing that our 
single unit auction theory can tell us is that when bidders' [signals] are affiliated ... the English [i.e. 
ascending] auction should be expected to raise the most revenue”. 
11 Whether the intuition need be non-mathematical, or even comprehensible to lay people, depends on the 
context, but we can surely have greater confidence in predicting agents’ actions when the agents concerned 
understand the logic behind them, especially when there are few opportunities for learning.   
  5 
practice, and it then follows that issues assumed away by the RET's assumptions should 
be looked at to choose between the standard auction forms.  These issues should include 
not just those made explicitly in the statement of the theorem, e.g., bidders are symmetric 
and risk-neutral, but also those that are implicit, e.g., bidders share common priors and 
play non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, or semi-implicit, e.g., the numbers and types of 
bidders are independent of the auction form.  
 
However, as already noted, much attention has focused on just one of the RET's 
assumptions, namely independence of the bidders’ information, and the theoretical result 
that if information is non-independent (affiliated) then ascending auctions are more 
profitable than first-price sealed-bid auctions.  There is no very compelling intuition for 
this result.  The verbal explanations that are given are unconvincing and/or misleading, or 
worse.  The most commonly given “explanation” is that ascending auctions allow bidders 
to be more aggressive, because their “winner's curses” are reduced,
12 but this argument is 
plain wrong: the winner’s curse is only a feature of common-value auctions, but common 
values are neither necessary nor sufficient for the result.
13 
 
A better explanation of the theoretical result is that bidders' profits derive from 
their private information, and the auctioneer can profit by reducing that private 
information.
14  An ascending auction reveals the information of bidders who drop out 
early, so partially reveals the winner's information (if bidders' information is correlated), 
and uses that information to set the price (through the runner-up's bid), whereas the price 
paid in a sealed-bid auction cannot use that information. Since the ascending and sealed-
bid auctions are revenue-equivalent absent any correlation (i.e., with independent 
signals), and provided the runner-up's bid responds to the additional information that an 
ascending auction reveals in the appropriate way (which it does when information is 
                                                                 
12 The “winner's curse” reflects the fact that winning an auction suggests one's opponents have pessimistic 
views about the value of the prize, and bidders must take this into account by bidding more conservatively 
than otherwise. 
13 The result applies with affiliated private values, in which bidders' values are unaffected by others' 
information, so there is no winner's curse, and the result does not apply to independent-signal common-
value auctions which do suffer from the winner's curse. (Where there is a winner's curse, the theory behind 
the argument is that bidders' private information can be inferred from the points at which they drop out of 
an ascending auction, so less “bad news” is discovered at the moment of winning than is discovered in 
winning a sealed-bid auction, so bidders can bid more aggressively in an ascending auction. But this 
assumes that bidders' more aggressive bidding more than compensates for the reduced winner's curse in an 
ascending auction – in independent-signal common-value auctions it exactly compensates, which is why 
there is no net effect, as the RET proves.) 
In fact, many experimental and empirical studies suggest bidders fail to fully account for winner's 
curse effects, so these effects may in practice make sealed-bid auctions more profitable than ascending 
auctions! 
14 Absent private information, the auctioneer would sell to the bidder with the highest expected valuation at 
that expected valuation, and bidders would earn no rents. The more general result that, on average, the 
selling price is increased by having it depend on as much information as possible about the value of the 
good, is Milgrom and Weber's (1982, 2000) Linkage Principle.  However, in more recent work, Perry and 
Reny (1999) show that the Principle applies less generally (even in theory) than was thought.  
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affiliated), this effect makes the ascending auction the more profitable.  Of course, this 
argument is obviously still incomplete,
 15,16 and even if it were fully convincing,
 it would 
depend on the exact RET applying – which seems a very strong claim. 
 
Furthermore, before relying on any theory mattering in practice, we need to ask: 
what is the likely order of magnitude of the effect?  In fact, numerical analysis suggests 
the effects of affiliation are often tiny, even when bidders who exactly fit the assumptions 
of the theory compute their bids exactly using the theory.   Riley and Li (1997) analyse 
equilibrium in a natural class of examples and show that the revenue difference between 
ascending and first-price auction is very small unless the information is very strongly 
affiliated: when bidders' values are jointly normally distributed, bidders’ expected rents 
are about 10% (20%) higher in a sealed-bid auction than in an ascending auction even for 
correlation coefficients as high as 0.3 (0.5).  So these results suggest affiliation could 
explain why a 3G spectrum auction earned, e.g., 640 rather than 650 euros per capita 
when bidders’ valuations were 700 euros per capita.  But the actual range was from just 
20 (twenty) to 650 euros per capita!  Riley and Li also find that that even with very strong 
affiliation, other effects, such as those of asymmetry, are more important and often 
reverse the effects of affiliation, even taking the numbers of bidders, non-cooperative 
behaviour, common priors, etc., as given.
17  This kind of quantitative analysis surely 
deserves more attention than economists often give it. 
                                                                 
15  Revealing more information clearly need not necessarily reduce bidders’ profits (if bidders’ information 
is negatively correlated, the contrary is typically true), the conditions that make the ascending price respond 
correctly to the additional information revealed are quite subtle, and nor does the argument say anything 
about how affiliation affects sealed bids.  Indeed there are simple and not unnatural examples with the 
“wrong kind” of positive correlation in which the ranking of auctions’ revenues is reversed (see Bulow and 
Klemperer, forthcoming), and Perry and Reny (1999) also show the trickiness of the argument by 
demonstrating that the result only holds for single-unit auctions.  A more complete verbal argument for the 
theoretical result is given in Klemperer (1999, Appendix C), but it is very hard (certainly for the layman).   
16 Another loose intuition is that in an ascending auction each bidder acts as if he is competing against an 
opponent with the same valuation. But in a sealed-bid auction a bidder must outbid those with lower 
valuations. With independent valuations, the RET applies. But if valuations are affiliated, a lower valuation 
bidder has a more conservative estimate of his opponent's valuation and therefore bids more conservatively. 
So a bidder in a s ealed-bid auction attempting to outbid lower-valuation bidders will bid more 
conservatively as well.  But this argument also rests on the RET applying exactly, and even so several steps 
are either far from compelling (for example, the optimal bid against a more conservative opponent is not 
always to be more conservative), or very non-transparent. 
17 An easier numerical example than Riley and Li’s assumes bidder i’s value is vi = q + ti, in which q and 
the ti's are independent and uniform on [0,1], and i knows only vi.  With two bidders, expected revenue is 
14/18 in a first-price sealed-bid auction and 15/18 in an ascending auction, so bidder rents are 7/18 and 
6/18 respectively (though with n bidders of whom n/2 each win a single object, as nﬁ ¥ bidder rents are 
42% higher in the sealed-bid auction). 
With very extreme affiliation, an auctioneer's profits may be more sensitive to the auction form.  
Modifying the previous example so that there are two bidders who have completely diffuse priors for q, 
bidder rents are fifty percent higher in a first-price sealed-bid auction than in an ascending auction (see 
Klemperer, 1999 Appendix D), and Riley and Li's example yields a similar result for correlation 
coefficients around .9 (when bidder rents are anyway small).  T hese examples assume private-values. 
Auctioneers' profits may also be more sensitive to auction form with common-values and, in the previous  
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Finally, all the previous discussion is in the context of single-unit auctions.  Perry 




Given all this, it is unsurprising that there is no empirical evidence (that I am 
aware of) that argues the affiliation effect is important.
19, 20  
 
So there seems no strong argument to expect affiliation to matter much in most 
practical applications; independence is not the assumption of the RET that most needs 
relaxing.  
 
The theory that really matters most for auction design is just the very elementary 
undergraduate economics of relaxing the implicit and semi-implicit assumptions of the 
RET about (fixed) entry and (lack of) collusion (see Klemperer, 2002b).
21  The intuitions 
are (as Marshall says they should be) easy to explain – we will see that it is clear that 
bidders are likely to understand and therefore to follow the undergraduate theory.  By 
contrast the intuition for affiliation gives no sense of how bidders should compute their 
bids, and the calculations required to do so optimally require considerable mathematical 
sophistication and are sensitive to the precise assumptions bidders make about the "prior" 
distributions from which their and others' private information is drawn.  Of course, this 
does not mean agents cannot intuitively make approximately optimal decisions (Machlup, 
1946; Friedman, 1953), and individual agents need not understand the intuitions behind 
equilibrium group outcomes.  But we can be more confident in predicting that agents will 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
extreme-affiliation model with diffuse priors on q, if bidders' signals are vi and the true common value is q, 
bidders' rents are twice as high in the sealed-bid auction as in the ascending auction.  But, with common 
values, small asymmetries between bidders are very much more important than affiliation (see Klemperer 
(1998), Bulow and Klemperer (2002)).  Moreover, we will see that other effects also seem to have been 
quantitatively much more important in practice than affiliation is even in any of these theoretical examples. 
18  The RET, also, only generalizes to a limited extent to multi-unit auctions. 
19 For example, empirical evidence about timber sales suggests rough revenue equivalence, or even that the 
sealed-bid auction raises more revenue given the number of bidders (Hansen (1986), Mead and Schneipp 
(1989), Paarsch (1991), Rothkopf and Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1993), Haile (1996)) though information is 
probably affiliated.  The experimental evidence (see Kagel and Roth, 1995 and Levin, Kagel, and Richard, 
1996) is also inconclusive about whether affiliation causes any difference between the revenues from 
ascending and sealed-bid auctions.  
20 Like Marshall, Colin Clark (1939) emphasised the importance of quantification and real-world facts (see 
note 1), writing “I have .. left my former colleagues in the English Universities .. with dismay at their 
continued preference for the theoretical .. approach to economic problems. Not one in a hundred .. seems to 
understand [the need for] the testing of conclusions against .. observed facts…” “..The result is a vast 
output of literature of which, it is safe to say, scarcely a syllable will be read in fifty years' time.”  I think he 
would be pleased that an academic from an English University is quoting his syllables well over fifty years 
after he wrote them. 
21 Risk-aversion and asymmetries (even absent entry issues) also arguably matter more than affiliation (and 
usually have the opposite effect).  It is striking that Maskin and Riley's (1984, 1999) important papers on 
these topics (see also Matthews, 1983, etc.) failed to have the same broad impact as Milgrom and Weber's 
work on affiliation.    
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make decisions w hose logic is very clear, especially in one-off events such as many 
auctions are.  
 
Not surprisingly, practical examples of the undergraduate theory are easy to give 
(as Marshall also insists). But there is no elegant theory applying to the specific context 
of auctions; such theory is unnecessary since the basic point is that the main concerns in 
auctions are just the same as in other economic markets, so much of the same theory 
applies (see below).  Furthermore, some of the key concerns are especially prominent 
when the assumption of symmetry is dropped, and models with asymmetries are often 
inelegant.  
 
So graduate students are taught the elegant mathematics of affiliation and 
whenever, and wherever, I give a seminar about auctions in practice,
22 I am asked a 
question along the lines of “Haven't Milgrom and Weber shown that ascending auctions 
raise most revenue, so why consider other alternatives?”.  This is true of seminars to 
academics.  It is even more true of seminars to policy makers.  Thus, although a little 
knowledge of economic theory is a good thing, too much knowledge can sometimes be a 
dangerous thing.  Moreover, the extraordinary influence of the concept of affiliation is 
only the most important example of this.  I give a further illustration, involving over- 
attention to some of my own work, in the next subsection.  In short, a little graduate 
education in auction theory can often distract attention from the straightforward 
“undergraduate” issues that really matter.
23   
 
 
3. The Elementary Economic Theory that Matters 
 
What really matters in practical auction design is robustness against collusion and 
attractiveness to entry – just as in ordinary industrial markets.
24  Since I have repeatedly 
argued this, much of the material of this section is drawn from Klemperer (2000b, 2002a, 
                                                                 
22 I have done this in over twenty countries in five continents. 
23 True, the generally accepted notion of the “received auction theory” is changing and so is the auction 
theory that is emphasized in graduate programmes. And recent auctions research has been heavily 
influenced by practical problems. But it will probably remain true that the elegance of a theory will remain 
an important determinant of its practical influence.  
24 Of course, auction theorists have not altogether ignored these issues – but the emphasis on them has been 
far less. The literature on collusion includes Robinson (1985), Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer (1987), 
Graham and Marshall (1987), Milgrom (1987), Hendricks and Porter (1989), Graham, Marshall, and 
Richard (1990), Mailath and Zemsky (1991), McAfee and McMillan (1992), Menezes (1996), Weber 
(1997), Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998), Ausubel and Schwartz (1999), Brusco and Lopomo (1999), 
Hendricks, Porter, and Tan (1999) and Cramton and Schwartz (2000).  That on entry includes Matthews 
(1984), Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1987), McAfee and McMillan (1987c), McAfee and McMillan (1988), 
Harstad (1990), Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1993), Levin and Smith (1994), Bulow and Klemperer (1996), 
Menezes and Monteiro (1997), Persico (1997), Klemperer (1998) and Gilbert and Klemperer (2000).  See 
also Klemperer (1999, 2000a).  
  9 




The received theory described above takes the number of bidders as given.  But 
the profitability of an auction depends crucially on the number of bidders who participate, 
and different auctions vary enormously in their attractiveness to entry; participating in an 
auction can be a costly exercise that bidders will only undertake if they feel they have 
realistic chances of winning.  In an ascending auction a stronger bidder can always top 
any bid that a weaker bidder makes, and knowing this the weaker bidder may not enter 
the auction in the first place – which may then allow the stronger bidder to win at a very 
low price.  In a first-price sealed-bid auction, by contrast, a weaker bidder may win at a 
price that the stronger bidder could have beaten, but didn't  because the stronger bidder 
may risk trying to win at a lower price and can't change his bid later.  So more bidders 
may enter a first-price sealed-bid auction.
25  
 
The intuition is very clear, and there is little need for sophisticated theory.  
Perhaps because of this, or because the argument depends on asymmetries between 
bidders so any theory is likely to be inelegant, theory has largely ignored the point.  
Vickrey's (1961) classic paper contains an example (relegated to an Appendix, and often 
overlooked) which illustrates the basic point that the player who actually has the lower 
value may win a first-price sealed-bid auction in Nash equilibrium, but that this cannot 
happen in an ascending auction (with private values).  But little has been said since.  
 
In fact, some of what has been written about the issue of attracting entry provides 
a further illustration of the potentially perverse impact of sophisticated theory.  Although 
the point that weaker bidders are unlikely to win ascending auctions, and may therefore 
not enter them, is very general,  some work  –  including Klemperer (1998)
26  –  has  
emphasized that the argument  is especially compelling for “almost-common-value” 
auctions,  and this work may have had the unintended side-effect of linking the entry 
concern to common values in some peoples' minds;
27 I have heard economists who know 
the latter work all too well say that because an auction does not involve common values, 
therefore there is no entry problem!
28  To the extent that the almost-common values 
                                                                 
25 The point is similar to the industrial-organization point that because a Bertrand market is more 
competitive than a Cournot market for any given number of firms, the Bertrand market may attract less 
entry, so the Cournot market may be more competitive if the number of firms is endogenous. 
26 See  also Bikhchandani (1988),  Bulow, Huang and Klemperer (1999), Bulow and Klemperer (2002), and 
Klemperer and Pagnozzi (2003). 
27  in spite of the fact that I have made the  point that the argument applies more broadly in, for example, 
Klemperer (1999b, 2002b). See also Gilbert and Klemperer (2000). 
28 Similarly others have asserted (in spite of publicly-available government documents that show the 
contrary) that the reason the UK planned to include a sealed-bid component in its 3G design if only four  
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theory (which is both of more limited application, and also assumes quite sophisticated 
reasoning by bidders) has distracted attention from the more general point, this is another 
example of excessive focus on sophisticated theory at the expense of more elementary, 
but more crucial, theory.  
 
There is an additional important reason why a first-price sealed-bid auction may 
be more attractive to entrants: bidders in a sealed-bid auction may be much less certain 
about opponents' strategies, and the advantage of stronger players may therefore be less 
pronounced, than standard equilibrium theory predicts.  The reason is that in practice, 
players are not likely to share common priors about distributions of valuations and, even 
if they do, they may not play Nash equilibrium strategies (that is, a sealed-bid auction 
induces “strategic uncertainty”).  So even if players were in fact ex-ante symmetric (that 
is, their private information is drawn from identical distributions) the lower-value player 
might win a first-price sealed-bid auction, but would never win an ascending auction in 
which bidders’ strategies are very straightforward and predictable.  When players are not 
symmetric, Nash equilibrium theory predicts that a weaker player will sometimes beat a 
stronger player in a sealed-bid auction, but I conjecture strategic uncertainty and the 
absence of common priors make this outcome even more likely than Nash Equilibrium 
predicts.  Since this point is very hard for standard economic theory to capture, it has 
largely been passed over.  But it reinforces the point that a sealed-bid auction is in many 
circumstances more likely than an ascending auction to attract entry, and this will often 
have a substantial effect on the relative profitabilities of the auctions.  
 
The 3G auctions provide good examples of over-sensitivity to the significance of 
information revelation and affiliation at the expense of insensitivity to the more important 
issue of entry.  For example, the Netherlands sold five 3G licences in a context in which 
there were also exactly five incumbent mobile-phone operators who were the natural 
winners, leaving no room for any entrant.  (For competition-policy reasons, bidders were 
permitted to win no more than one licence each).  The problem of attracting enough entry 
to have a competitive auction should therefore have been uppermost in planners’ minds.  
But the planners seem instead to have been seduced by the fact that ascending auctions 
raise (a little) extra revenue because of affiliation and also increase the likelihood of an 
efficient allocation to those with the highest valuations.
29  The planners were probably 
also influenced by the fact that previous spectrum auctions in the U.S. and U.K. had used 
ascending designs,
30 even though they had usually done so in contexts in which entry was 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
licences were available for sale (see below), was because the auction designers (who included me) thought 
the auction was almost-common values. 
29 It seems unlikely that the efficiency of the Netherlands auction was much improved by the ascending 
design. 
30 We discuss the U.K. design below. The design of the U.S. auctions, according to McMillan (1994, p.151-
2) who was a consultant to the FCC, was largely determined by faith in the linkage principle and hence in 
the revenue advantages of an ascending auction in the presence of affiliation. These advantages meant that 
the economic theorists advising the government judged other potential problems with the ascending design  
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less of a concern, and even though some U.S. auctions did suffer from entry problems.  
The result of the Netherlands auction was both predictable, and predicted (see, for 
example, Maasland (2000) and Klemperer (2000b) quoted in the Dutch press prior to the 
auction).  There was no serious entrant.
31  Revenue was less than a third of what had been 
predicted and barely a quarter of the per capita amounts raised in the immediately 
preceding and immediately subsequent 3G auctions (in the U.K. and Germany 
respectively). The resulting furore in the press led to a Parliamentary Inquiry.  
 
By contrast, when Denmark faced a very similar situation in its 3G auctions in 
late 2001 – four licences for sale and four incumbents – its primary concern was to 
encourage entry.
32 (The designers had both observed the Netherlands fiasco, and also 
read Klemperer (2000b).)  It chose a sealed-bid design (a “4th price” auction) and had a 
resounding success.  A serious entrant bid, and revenue far exceeded expectations and 
was more than twice the levels achieved by any of the other three European 3G auctions 
(Switzerland, Belgium and Greece) that took place since late 2000.  
 
The academics who designed the UK sale (which was held prior to the 
Netherlands and Danish auctions) also thought much harder about entry into their 3G 
auction.
33  The UK had four incumbent operators, and when design work began it was 
unclear how many licenses it would be possible to offer given the technological 
constraints. We realised that if there were just four licenses available it would be hard to 
persuade a non-incumbent to enter, so we planned in that case to use a design including a 
sealed-bid component (an "Anglo-Dutch" design) to encourage entry.  In the event, five 
licenses were available so, given the UK context, we switched to an ascending auction, 
since there was considerable uncertainty about who the fifth strongest bidder would be 
(we ran the world's first 3G auction in part to ensure this — see Section 5).
34  13 bidders 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
“to be outweighed by the bidders' ability to learn from other bids in the auction” (McMillan, 1994). (See 
also Perry and Reny (1999).) Efficiency was also a concern in the design of the U.S. auctions. 
31 There was one entrant who probably did  not seriously expect to win a license in an ascending auction - 
indeed it argued strongly prior to the auction that an ascending auction gave it very little chance and, more 
generally, reduced the likelihood of entry into the auction. Perhaps it competed in the hope of being bought 
off by an incumbent by, e.g., gaining access rights to an incumbent's network, in return for its quitting the 
auction early. The Netherlands government should be very grateful that this entrant competed for as long as 
it did! See Klemperer (2002a) and van Damme (2002) for details. 
32 Entry was an even more severe problem in late 2001 than in early summer 2000 when the Netherlands 
auction was held. The dotcom boom was over, European telecoms stock prices at the time of the Danish 
auction were just one third the levels they were at in the Dutch auction, and the prospects for 3G were 
much dimmer than they had seemed previously. 
33   I was the principal auction theorist advising the Radiocommunications Agency which designed and ran 
the U.K. auction.  Ken Binmore had a leading role, including also supervising experiments testing the 
proposed designs.  Other academic advisors included Tilman Borgers, Jeremy Bulow, Philippe Jehiel and 
Joe Swierzbinksi.  Ken Binmore subsequently advised the Danish government on its very successful 
auction.  The views expressed in this paper are mine alone. 
34 With five licenses, the licenses would be of unequal size, which argued for an ascending design.  Note 
that in some contexts an ascending design may promote entry. For example, when Peter Cramton, Eric 
Maskin and I advised the U.K. government on the design of its March 2002 auction of reductions in  
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entered, ensuring a highly competitive auction which resulted in the highest per capita 




The received auction theory also assumes bidders play non-cooperatively in Nash 
equilibrium. We have already discussed how Nash equilibrium may be a poor prediction 
because of “strategic uncertainty” and the failure of the common priors assumption, but a 
more fundamental problem is that players may behave collusively rather than non-
cooperatively.  In particular, a standard ascending auction  – especially a multi-unit 
ascending auction – often satisfies all the conditions that elementary economic theory 
tells us are important for facilitating collusion, even without any possibility of interaction 
or discussion among bidders beyond the information communicated in their bids.  
 
For example, Waterson's (1984) standard industrial organization textbook lists 
five questions that must be answered affirmatively for firms to be able to support 
collusion in an ordinary industrial market: 1) Can firms easily identify efficient divisions 
of the market? 2) can firms easily agree on a division? 3) can firms easily detect defection 
from any agreement? 4) can firms credibly punish any observed defection? 5) can firms 
deter non-participants in the agreement from entering the industry?  In a multi-unit 
ascending auction: 1) the objects for sale are well-defined, so firms can see how to share 
the collusive “pie” among them (by contrast with the problem of sharing an industrial 
market whose definition may not be obvious), 2) bids can be used to signal proposals 
about how the division should be made and to signal agreement, 3) firms' pricing (that is, 
bidding) is immediately and perfectly observable, so defection from any collusive 
agreement is immediately detected, 4) the threat of punishment for defection from the 
agreement is highly credible, since punishment is quick and easy and often costless to the 
punisher in a multi-object auction in which a player has the ability to raise the price only 
on objects that the defector will win,
35 and 5) we have already argued that entry in an 
ascending auction may be hard.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
greenhouse gas emissions, we recommended an ascending design to encourage the entry of small bidders 
for whom working out how to bid sensibly in a discriminatory sealed-bid auction might have been 
prohibitively costly.  (Strictly speaking the auction was a descending one since the auction was a reverse 
auction in which firms were bidding to sell emissions reductions to the government. But this is equivalent 
to an ascending design for a standard auction to sell permits.)  (Larry Ausubel and Jeremy Bulow were also 
involved in the implementation of this design.)  
35 For example, in a multi-license U.S. spectrum auction in 1996-97, U.S. West was competing vigorously 
with McLeod for lot number 378 – a license in Rochester, Minnesota. Although most bids in the auction 
had been in exact thousands of dollars, U.S. West bid $313,378 and $62,378 for two licenses in Iowa in 
which it had earlier shown no interest, overbidding McLeod, who had seemed to be the uncontested high-
bidder for these licenses.  McLeod got the point that it was being punished for competing in Rochester, and 
dropped out of that market.  Since McLeod made subsequent higher bids on the Iowa licenses, the 
“punishment” bids cost U.S. West nothing (Cramton and Schwartz, 2000).  
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So collusion in an ascending auction seems much easier to sustain than in an 
“ordinary” industrial market, and it should therefore be no surprise that ascending 
auctions provide some particularly clear examples of collusion, as we illustrate below.  
 
By contrast, a first-price sealed-bid auction is usually much more robust to 
collusion: bidders cannot “exchange views” through their bids, or observe opponents' 
bids until after the auction is over, or punish defection from any agreement during the 
course of the auction, or easily deter entry.    But, perhaps because auction theorists have 
little that is new or exciting to say about collusion, too little attention has been given to 
this elementary issue in practical applications.  
 
In the Austrian 3G auction, for example, twelve identical blocks of spectrum were 
sold to six bidders in a simultaneous ascending auction (bidders were allowed to win 
multiple blocks each). No-one was in the least surprised when the bidding stopped just 
above the low reserve price with each bidder winning two blocks,
36 at perhaps one-third 
the price that bidders valued them at.
37  Clearly the effect of “collusion” (whether explicit 
and illegal, or tacit and possibly legal) on revenues is first-order.  
 
Another elegant example of bidders' ability to “collude” is provided by the 1999 
German DCS-1800 auction in which ten blocks of spectrum were sold by ascending 
auction, with the rule that any new bid on a block had to exceed the previous high bid by 
at least 10 percent.
38   There were just two credible bidders, the two largest German 
mobile-phone companies T -Mobil and Mannesman, and Mannesman's first bids were 
18.18 million deutschmarks per megahertz on blocks 1-5 and 20 million deutschmarks 
per MHz on blocks 6-10. T -Mobil – who bid even less in the first round – later said 
“There were no agreements with Mannesman.  But [we] interpreted Mannesman's first 
bid as an offer.”  (Stuewe, 1999, p.13).  The point is that 18.18 plus a 10 percent raise 
equals 20.00.  It seems T -Mobil understood that if it bid 20 million deutschmarks per 
MHz on blocks 1-5, but did not bid again on blocks 6-10, the two companies would then 
live and let live with neither company challenging the other on the other's half.  Exactly 
that happened. So the auction closed after just two rounds with each of the bidders 
                                                                 
36 Although it did not require rocket science to determine the obvious way to divide twelve among six, the 
largest incumbent, Telekom Austria probably assisted the coordination when it announced in advance of 
the auction that it “would be satisfied with just two of the 12 blocks of frequency on offer” and “if the [5 
other bidders] behaved similarly it should be possible to get the frequencies on sensible terms”, but “it 
would bid for a third frequency block if one of its rivals did” (Crossland, 2000). 
37 This extremely rough estimate is based on comparisons with other countries, allowing for changes in 
stock-market sentiment, etc., and is consistent with others' estimates.   It is less than one-sixth the per capita 
price achieved three months earlier in the German auction. 
38 Unlike my other examples this was not a 3G auction; however, it is highly relevant to the German 3G 
auction which we will discuss.  
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acquiring half the blocks for the same low price, which was a small fraction of the 
valuations that the bidders actually placed on the blocks.
39  
 
This example makes another important point. The elementary theory that tells us 
that “collusion” is easy in this context is important.  The reader may think it obvious that 
bidders can “collude” in the setting described, but that is because the reader has been 
exposed to elementary undergraduate economic theory. This point was beautifully 
illustrated by the behaviour of the subjects in an  experiment that was specifically 
designed to advise one of the bidders in this auction by mimicking its setting and rules: 
the experimental subjects completely failed to achieve the low-price “collusive” outcome 
that was achieved in practice.  Instead “..... in [all] the [experimental] sessions the bidding 
was very competitive.  Subjects went for all ten units in the beginning, and typically 
reduced their bidding rights only when the budget limit forced them to do so.” (Abbink et 
al, 2002.) So the elementary economic theory of collusion which makes it plain, by 
contrast, that the “collusive” outcome that actually arose was to be expected from more 
sophisticated players does matter  – and I feel confident that the very distinguished 
economists who ran the experiments advised their bidder more on the basis of the 
elementary theory than on the basis of the experiments.
40 
 
Both the U.K.'s and Denmark's academic advisors gave considerable thought to 
preventing collusion.  Denmark, for example, not only ran a sealed-bid auction, but also 
allowed bidders to submit multiple bids at multiple locations with the rule that only the 
highest bid made by any bidder would count, and also arranged for phoney bids to be 
submitted – the idea was that bidders could not (illegally) agree to observe each others' 
bids without fear that their partners in collusion would double-cross them, and nor could 




                                                                 
39 See Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2001, and  Grimm, Riedel and Wolfstetter, 2001. Grimm et al argue that this 
outcome was a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium of the fully-specified game.  This is similar to the 
familiar industrial organization point that oligopolistic outcomes that we call “collusive” may be Nash 
equilibria of repeated oligopoly games.  But our focus is on whether outcomes look like competitive, non-
cooperative, behaviour in the simple analyses that are often made, not on whether or not they can be 
justified as Nash equilibria in more sophisticated models. 
40  Abbink et al write “The lessons learnt from the experiments are complemented by theoretical strategic 
considerations”. Indeed, auctions policy advice should always, if possible, be informed by both theory and 
experiments. 
41 In the U.K.'s ascending auction, the fact that bidders were each restricted to winning at most a single 
object, out of just five objects, ruled out tacit collusion to divide the spoils (provided that there were more 
than five bidders).  More important, the large number of bidders expected (because the U.K. ran Europe's 
first 3G auction – see Section 5) also made explicit (illegal) collusion much less likely, (see Klemperer, 
2002a) and the fact that the U.K. retained the right to cancel the auction in some circumstances also 
reduced bidders' incentive to collude.  
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4. Robustness to Political Pressures 
 
To be effective, economic advice must also be sensitive to the organizational and 
political context; it is important to be realistic about how advice will be acted on.  
Economic advisors commonly explain a policy failure with the excuse that “it would 
have been okay if they had followed our advice.”  But medical practitioners are expected 
to take account of the fact that patients will not follow their every instruction.
42  Why 
should economic practitioners be different?  Maybe it should be regarded as economic 
malpractice to give advice that will actually make matters worse if it is not followed 
exactly.  
 
For example, the economic theorists advising the Swiss government on its 3G 
auction favoured a multi-unit ascending auction, apparently arguing along the standard 
received- auction-theory lines that this was best for both efficiency and revenue. But they 
recognised the dangers of such an auction encouraging “collusive” behaviour and 
deterring entry, and the advisors therefore also proposed setting a high reserve price. This 
would not only directly limit the potential revenue losses from collusion and/or 
inadequate entry but, importantly, also reduce the likelihood of collusion (with a high 
reserve price, bidders are relatively more likely to prefer to raise the price to attempt to 
drive their rivals out altogether, than to collude with them at the reserve price (see 
Klemperer, 2002b, and Brusco and Lopomo, 2002)).  
 
But serious reserve prices are often unpopular with politicians and bureaucrats 
who – even if they have the information to set them sensibly – are often reluctant to run 
even a tiny risk of not selling the objects, which outcome they fear would be seen as “a 
failure”.  
 
The upshot was that no serious reserve was set.  Through exit, joint-venture, and 
possibly  – it was rumoured – collusion,
43 the number of bidders shrank to equal the 
number of licences available, so the remaining bidders had to pay only the trivial reserve 
price that had been fixed.  (Firms were allowed to win just a single licence each.)  The 
                                                                 
42 Doctors are trained to recognize that some types of patients may not take all prescribed medicines or 
return for follow-up treatment.  Pharmaceutical companies have developed one-dose regimens that are 
often more expensive or less effective than multiple-dose treatments, but that overcome these specific 
problems.  For example, the treatment of chlamydial infection by a single dose of azithromycin is much 
more expensive and no more effective than a 7 day course of doxycycline; there is a short (2 month) course 
of preventive therapy for tuberculosis that is both more expensive, and seems to have more problems with 
side effects, than the longer 6 month course; and the abridged regimen for HIV+ women who are pregnant 
(to prevent perinatal transmission) is less effective than the longer,  more extensive treatment. 
43 Tele Danmark announced its acquisitions of Diax (an incumbent operator) and Sunrise (which was partly 
owned by BT) the day before the auction was due to begin, and a total of five bidders quit in the last four 
days before the auction.  At least one bidder had quit earlier after hiring bidding consultants and hearing 
from them that because it was a weaker bidder it had very little chance of winning an ascending auction.  
Furthermore, the regulator investigated rumours that Deutsche Telekom agreed not to participate in the 
auction in return for subsequently being able to buy into one of the winners.  
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outcome was met with jubilation by the bidders and their shareholders; per capita 
revenues were easily the lowest of any of the nine western European 3G auctions, and 
less than one-thirtieth of what the government had been hoping for.
44,45  Perhaps an 
ascending auction together with a carefully chosen reserve price was a reasonable choice. 
But an ascending auction with only a trivial reserve price was a disaster, and the 




Economic Similarity „ Political Similarity 
 
Hong Kong's auction was another case where designers should perhaps have 
anticipated the political response to their advice. The Hong Kong auction's designers, like 
Denmark's, had observed the Netherlands fiasco (and had also read Klemperer, 2000b).  
So they were keen to use a sealed-bid design, given Hong Kong's situation.
47  
Specifically, they favoured a “fourth-price” sealed-bid design so that all four winners 
(there were four licences and firms could win at most one licence each) would pay the 
same fourth-highest bid – charging winners different amounts for identical properties 
might both be awkward and  lead to cautious bidding by managements who did not want 
to risk the embarrassment of paying more than their rivals.
48 
 
                                                                 
44 The final revenues were 20 Euros per capita, compared to analysts' estimates of 400-600 Euros per capita 
in the week before the auction was due to begin, and a tiny fraction even of those achieved in Austria, 
whose auction was scheduled less than two weeks earlier. Meeks (2001) shows the jumps in Swisscom's 
share price around the auction are highly statistically-significant and, controlling for general market 
movements, correspond to the market believing that bidders paid several hundred Euros per capita less in 
the auction than was earlier anticipated. 
45 In fact, when the denouement of the auction had become clear, the Swiss government tried to cancel it 
and re-run it with different rules.  But in contrast to the UK auction (see note ~32), the designers had also 
omitted to allow themselves that possibility. 
46 I am not arguing that an ascending auction plus reserve price is always bad advice, or even that it was 
necessarily poor advice here. But advisors must be very clear if success depends on a whole package being 
adopted, and should think carefully about the likely implementation of their proposals. 
Greece and Belgium did set reserve prices that seem to have been carefully thought out, but they 
were perhaps encouraged to do so by the intense criticism of the Swiss auction, and also of the Italian and 
Austrian auctions which had reserve prices that were clearly too low, even if not as low as Switzerland's. 
47 In Hong Kong, unlike in the Netherlands and Denmark, there were actually more incumbents than 
licences. But it was not clear that all incumbents were strong. Furthermore, strong firms may form joint 
ventures (either legally or through illegal collusion) to reduce the number of entrants and this is much more 
attractive prior to a standard ascending auction (when the strengthened combined bidder further 
discourages entry) than prior to a standard sealed-bid auction (when reducing two strong bidders to one 
may attract entry). 
In any case there was a very serious concern – well-justified as it turned out – that in a standard 
ascending auction there would be no more bidders than licences. 
48 In a simple model, if a winning bidder suffers "embarrassment costs" which are an increasing function of 
the difference between his payment and the lowest winning payment, then bidders are no worse off in 
expectation than in an auction which induces no embarrassment costs, but the auctioneer suffers.  This is a 
consequence of the Revenue Equivalence Theorem: under its assumptions, mechanisms that induce  
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However, the designers were also afraid that if the public could observe the top 
three bids after the auction, then if these were very different from the price that the firms 
actually paid (the fourth highest bid), the government would be criticised for selling the 
licences for less than the firms had shown themselves willing to pay.  Of course, such 
criticism would be ill-informed, but it could still be damaging, because even well-
intentioned commentators find it hard to explain to the general public that requiring firms 
to pay their own bids would result in firms bidding differently.  Thus far, nothing was 
different from the situation in Denmark.  However, whereas the Danish government 
simply followed the advice it was given to keep all the bids secret and reveal only the 
price paid, the Hong Kong government felt it could not do this.  
 
Openness and transparency of government was a big political issue in the wake of 
Hong Kong's return to Chinese rule, and it was feared that secrecy would be impossible 
to maintain. The advisors therefore proposed to run an auction that was strategically 
equivalent (that is, has an identical game-theoretic structure and therefore should induce 
identical behaviour) to a fourth-price auction, but that did not reveal the three high bids to 
anyone.
49  To achieve this, an ascending auction would be run for the four identical 
licences, but dropouts would be kept secret and the price would continue to rise until the 
point at which the number of players remaining dropped from four to three. At this point 
the last four (including the firm that had just “dropped out”) would pay the last price at 
which four players remained in the bidding.  Since nothing was revealed to any player 
until the auction was over, no player had any decision to make except to choose a single 
dropout price, in the knowledge that if its price was among the top four then it would pay 
the fourth-highest dropout price; that is, the situation was identical from the firm's 
viewpoint to choosing a single bid in a fourth-price sealed-bid auction.  But, unlike in 
Denmark, no one would ever see the “bids” planned by the top three winners (and since 
these bids would never even have been placed, very little credibility would have attached 
to reports of them).  
 
However, although the proposed auction was mathematically (i.e., strategically) 
equivalent to a sealed-bid auction, its verbal description was very different.  The stronger 
incumbents lobbied vigorously for a “small change” to the design  – that the price be 
determined when the numbers dropped from five to four, rather than from four to three.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
embarrassment costs  cannot affect bidders' utilities (it is irrelevant to the bidders whether the 
"embarrassment costs" are received by the auctioneer or are social waste), so in equilibrium winning 
bidders’ expected payments are lower by the expected embarrassment costs they suffer.  See Klemperer 
(2002e). 
49 I had no direct involvement with this auction but, embarrassingly, I am told this “solution” was found in 
a footnote to Klemperer (2000b) that pointed out this method of running a strategically equivalent auction 
to the uniform fourth-price auction, and that it might (sometimes) be more politically acceptable.  See also 
Binmore and Klemperer (2002).    
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This is the “standard” way of running an ascending auction, and it recreates the 
standard problem that entry is deterred because strong players can bid aggressively in the 
knowledge that the winners will only pay a loser's bid (the fifth bid) and not have to pay 
one of the winners' bids. 
 
Revealingly, one of the strong players that, it is said, lobbied so strongly for 
changing the proposal was at the same time a weaker player (a potential entrant) in the 
Danish market and, it is said, professed itself entirely happy with the fourth-price sealed-
bid rules for that market.  
 
Since the change the firms lobbied for seemed to make things more “standard”, 
and seemed small (and perhaps not all the decision-makers understood – or wanted to 
understand – its larger significance), the government gave way and made it.
50,51 
The result?  Just four bidders entered and paid the reserve price – a major disappointment 
for the government, and yielding perhaps one third to one half the revenue that had been 
anticipated (correcting for market conditions).  Whether other potential bidders gave up 
altogether, or whether they made collusive agreements with stronger bidders not to enter 
(as was rumoured in the press), is unknown.  But what is certain is that the design finally 
chosen made entry much harder and collusion much easier.  
 
It is not clear what the economic theorists advising should have recommended.  
Perhaps they should have stuck to a (fourth-price) sealed-bid auction run in the standard 
way, but used computer technology that could determine the price to be paid while 
making it impossible for anyone other than the bidders to know the other bids made.  
 
The moral, however, is clear.  Auction designs that seem similar to economic 
theorists may seem very different to politicians, bureaucrats and the public, and vice-
versa.  And political and lobbying pressures need to be predicted and planned for in 
advance.  
 
When the designers of the U.K. 3G auction proposed a design – the Anglo-Dutch 
– that was very unattractive to the incumbent operators, it probably helped that two 
alternative versions of the design were initially offered.  Whilst the incumbent operators 
hated the overall design and lobbied furiously against it,
52 they also had strong 
                                                                 
50 Not only was the change argued to be “small”, and to make the auction more “standard”, but it was also 
argued that it was “unfair” to have the bidders continue to bid against themselves when there were just four 
left. These points were all politically salient, even though they are irrelevant or meaningless from a strictly 
game-theoretic viewpoint. Moreover, the academic consultants who proposed the original design to the 
committee responsible for the auction details had very little influence at the higher political levels at which 
the final decision was taken. 
51 The highly sophisticated security arrangements that had been made to ensure secrecy of the dropouts 
(removal of bidding teams to separate top-secret locations in army camps, etc.) were not altered even 
though they had become much less relevant; there was no need to lobby against these. 
52 It is rumoured that a single bidder's budget for economic advice for lobbying against the design exceeded 
the U.K. government's expenditure on economic advice during the entire three-year design process; the  
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preferences between its two versions, and much of their lobbying efforts therefore 
focused on the choice between them.  When the government selected the version the 
operators preferred (the designers actually preferred this version too) the operators felt 
they had got a part of what they had asked for, and it proved politically possible for the 




Another notorious “political failure” was the design of the 1998 Netherlands 2G 
spectrum auction.  The EU Commission objected to the Netherlands government's rules 
for the auction shortly before the (EU imposed) deadline for the allocation of the 
licences.  The rules were therefore quickly rewritten by a high-ranking civil servant on a 
Friday afternoon.  The result was an auction that sold similar properties at prices that 




Economists are now waking up to the importance of these issues: Wilson (2002) 
addresses political constraints in the design of auction markets for electricity, and Roth 
(2002)  also discusses political aspects of market design.  But the politics of design 




5. Understanding the Wider Context 
 
Any consultant new to a situation must beware of overlooking issues that are well 
understood by those with more experience of the environment.  The danger is perhaps 
particularly acute for economic theorists who are used to seeing the world through 
models that, while very elegant, are often lacking in real-world detail and context.  
 
The German 3G auction illustrates the importance of the wider context.  As we 
described in section 3, in Germany's 1999 DCS-1800 auction Mannesman used its bids to 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
lobbying effort included hiring two Nobel prize winners in the hope of finding arguments against the 
design.  See Binmore and Klemperer (2002) for details of the two versions of the design. 
53 When it became possible to offer an additional fifth licence in the U.K. the design changed – as had been 
planned for this circumstance – to a pure ascending one, see Section 3. 
54 This auction also illustrates that errors made by bidders can be important in determining the outcomes of 
small-numbers auctions: although high stakes were involved (the revenues were over 800 million euros) it 
seems that the outcome, and perhaps also the efficiency of the allocation of licences, was critically affected 
by a bidder unintentionally losing its eligibility to bid on additional properties later in the auction; it has 
been suggested that this bidder’s behavior can only be explained by the fact that it happened on “Carnival 
Monday”, a day of celebrations and drinking in the south of the Netherlands where the bidder is based (van 
Damme, 1999)!  (The German 3G auction described below provides another example of the large role that 
bidder error can play, though in this case it only affected the auction’s revenue and not the efficiency of the 
allocation of licenses.)  
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signal very clearly to T-Mobil how the two firms should divide the blocks between them 
and end the auction at a comparatively low price.  T-Mobil then cut back its demand in 
exactly the way Mannesman suggested, and Mannesman followed through with its half of 
the “bargain” by also cutting back its demand, so the auction ended with the two firms 
winning similar amounts of spectrum very cheaply.  
 
It seems that Mannesman used the same advisors in the 3G auction that it had 
used in the GSM auction.  Although the rules for the 3G auction were not identical, it was 
another simultaneous ascending auction in which individual bidders were permitted to 
win multiple blocks.  After the number of bidders had fallen to six competing for a total 
of twelve blocks, and when it was clear that the other four bidders would be content with 
two blocks each, Mannesman apparently signalled to T-Mobil to cut back its demand to 
just two blocks.
55  If T-Mobil and Mannesman had both done this the auction would have 
ended at modest prices.  Instead T-Mobil seemingly ignored Mannesman's signals, and 
drove up the total price 15 billion Euros before cutting back demand.  Once T-Mobil did 
cut back its demand, Mannesman followed, so the auction ended with the allocation that 
Mannesman had originally signalled but with each of the six firms paying an additional 
2½ billion Euros!  It seems that Mannesman's advisors saw the GSM auction as a 
template for the 3G auction; they took the view that, following previous practice, 
Mannesman would signal when to reduce demand, T -Mobil would acquiesce, a nd 
Mannesman would then follow through on its half of the bargain.
56  The bargain would 
be enforced by firms not wishing to jeopardise their future cooperation in subsequent 
auctions (including 3G auctions in other countries) and in negotiating with regulators, etc. 
(and the short-run advantage that could be gained by failing to cooperate was anyway 
probably small, see Klemperer, 2002c).  But given their expectation that T-Mobil would 
cut back demand first, Mannesman's advisors were unwilling to reduce demand when T-
Mobil did not.  
 
Clearly, T -Mobil's advisors saw things differently.  It seems that their main 
advisors had not been involved in the GSM auction and the example of the previous 
auction was certainly not in the forefront of their minds.  Instead they mistrusted 
Mannesman's intentions, and were very unwilling to cut back demand without proof that 
Mannesman had already done so.  True the 3G auction was a much more complicated 
game than the GSM auction because of the other parties involved, and Klemperer (2002c) 
                                                                 
55 According to the Financial Times, “One operator has privately admitted to altering the last digit of its 
bid... to signal to other participants that it was willing to accept a small licence.” 3/11/2000, p21. 
56 It seems that another reason why Mannesman expected the firms to coordinate by T-Mobil reducing 
demand first in response to Mannesman’s signals was that Mannesman saw itself as the leading firm in the 
market.  In fact, T-Mobil might have argued about whether Mannesman was the leading firm – the two 
firms were closely matched – and this may have been part of the problem. But Mannesman certainly saw 
itself as the leader, and this was also the view of, e.g., Abbink et al (2002).  
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discusses other factors that may have contributed to the firms' failure to reduce demand.
57 
But T-Mobil's refusal to cut back demand very likely stemmed partly from viewing the 
3G auction in a different, and narrower, context than Mannesman did. 
 
Just as previous auctions within any country might have been an important part of 
the wider context, auctions in other countries are also relevant parts of the broader 
environment: the sequencing of the 3G auctions across countries was crucial.  Countries 
that auctioned earlier had more entrants, because weaker bidders had not yet worked out 
that they were weaker and quit the auctions, because stronger bidders had not yet worked 
how and with whom to do joint ventures, and because complementarities between the 
values of licences in different countries reinforced these effects – the number of entrants 
in the nine western European auctions were (in order) 13, 6, 7, 6, 6, 4, 3, 3, and 5 
respectively.
58  Countries that auctioned earlier also suffered less from “collusive” 
behaviour, because bidders had had less practice in learning how best to play the game.  
For example, when the Austrian 3G auction followed the German 3G auction that we 
have just described, using almost the same design, all the bidders very quickly saw the 
mutual advantage of coordinating a demand reduction (see Section 3).
59   
 
The U.K. government’s advisers anticipated this pattern of declining competition, 
and chose to run its auction first; indeed we persisted in the policy of running the first 
auction even when others were advising us to delay (see Binmore and Klemperer, 2002).  
Yet in more than one country auction theorists advising on 3G auction design seemed 
either unaware of (!), or at least unaffected in their thinking by, the fact that there was to 
be a sequence of auctions across Europe.  Clearly these designers had far too narrow a 
view of the problem.
60 
 
Of course, other auctions are only the most obvious aspects of the wider context 
that auction designers need to consider.  There are many other ways in which designers 
showed themselves very poor at thinking about the wider game.  For example, many of 
the 3G auction designers had a very limited understanding of how the auction process 
affected, and was affected by, the series of telecom mergers and alliances that the advent 
                                                                 
57   In particular, the firms might have been concerned about their relative performances.  See also Grimm 
et al (2002), Jehiel and Moldovanu (2002), and Ewerhart and Moldovanu (2002). 
58 Furthermore, the number (6) achieved in the second auction (Netherlands) was perhaps lowered by the 
peculiarly incompetent design; the number (5) achieved in the last auction (Denmark) was raised by its  
design, which was very skilful except in its timing – see section 3. 
Of course, other factors, in particular the fall in the telecoms stock price index, may have contributed to the 
fall in the number of entrants. 
59   Klemperer (2002a) develops the arguments in this paragraph in much more detail. 
60 Some of the incumbent bidders, by contrast, may possibly have had a clearer understanding.  In an 
interesting example of the importance of political pressures, the Dutch operators successfully lobbied to 
delay the Netherlands auction and the clear gap that was thereby created between the British and Dutch 
auctions may have been a contributory factor to the Dutch fiasco.  
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of 3G engendered – in the U.K. alone, there were no fewer than five mergers involving 




6. Using Economic Theory 
 
I have argued that while a good understanding of elementary undergraduate 
economic theory is essential to successful auction design, advanced graduate auction 
theory is often less important.  It is important to emphasise, therefore, the crucially 
important role that advanced formal theory plays in developing our economic 
understanding.  In particular, advanced theory often develops deeper connections 
between apparently distinct economic questions than are superficially apparent.  
 
For example, Klemperer (forthcoming) demonstrates that auction-theoretic tools 
provide useful arguments in a broad range of mainstream economic contexts.  As a 
further illustration, I will discuss how a part of the received auction theory – the effect of 
affiliation  – that was, I have argued, not central to the auctions of 3G licences, can 




Do E-commerce and M-commerce raise consumer prices? 
 
Some commentators and regulators have expressed concern that e-commerce and 
M-commerce ("mobile commerce" in which people purchase through their mobile 
phones, and which is predicted to expand rapidly as a result of 3G technology) allow 
firms to easily identify and collect information about their customers which they can use 
to "rip them off".
63 
 
A simple analysis realizes that each consumer is analogous to an auctioneer, while 
firms are bidders competing to sell to that consumer.  As we discussed in Section 2, 
bidders’ expected profits derive from their private information, and the auctioneer 
generally gains by reducing the amount of bidders' private information.  So if all firms 
learn the same piece of information about a given consumer, this (weakly) reduces the 
                                                                 
61 Klemperer (2002d) gives another illustration of how real-world context that was non-obvious to outsiders 
was important to the UK 3G auction. 
62 Klemperer (forthcoming) uses the other main piece of the received auction theory –  the Revenue 
Equivalence Theorem – to solve a war of attrition between several technologies competing to become an 
industry standard in, e.g., 3G (see also Bulow and Klemperer, 1999) and to compute the value of new 
customers to firms when consumers have switching costs as they do for e.g., 3G phones (see also Bulow 
and Klemperer, 1998).  Klemperer (forthcoming) also uses auction theory to address how e-commerce (and 
likewise M-commerce) affects pricing. 
63 The US Federal Trade Commission has held hearings on this issue, and the European Commission is 
currently studying it.  Amazon has admitted charging different prices to different consumers.  
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private information that any bidder has relative to the other bidders, and so often benefits 
the auctioneer, that is, lowers the consumer's expected transaction price.  
 
Although this result is a good start, it is neither very novel,
64 nor does it address 
the bigger concern that e -and M -commerce allow different firms to learn different 
information about any given consumer.  However, Bulow and Klemperer (forthcoming) 
show how to use the mathematics of affiliation to address this issue too; in our model, 
even if firms learn different information about the consumers, this makes  the market 
more competitive.  In other words, a quick application of Milgrom and Weber's (1982) 
analysis suggests that the "loss of privacy" caused by 3G and the internet is actually good 
for consumers.  
 
Of course, having been cautious about the practical significance of affiliation in 
auction design, we should also be cautious about asserting that Bulow and Klemperer's 
argument shows that 3G is not as valuable to firms as some people once thought.
65  
However, our model suggests a possibility which needs further study  – including 
considering any empirical evidence and the plausibility of the intuitions – to confirm or 
disconfirm.  Moreover, it certainly demonstrates that just because firms learn more about 
consumers, it does not follow that they can exploit them better – just as the RET refutes 
any simple presumption that one form of auction is always the most profitable.  Our 
analysis therefore shows that firms' learning has other effects in addition to the very 
obvious one that firms can price-discriminate more effectively, and it helps us to see what 
these effects are
66 – we can then consider further whether these effects are plausibly 
significant.  It also provides a structure which suggests what other factors not in the 
simplest model might in fact be important, and might perhaps yield the originally-
hypothesised result.
67  And it very quickly and efficiently yields results that provide a 
good starting point for such further analysis.  
 
                                                                 
64 Thisse and Vives (1988), Ulph and Vulkan (2001), and Esteves (forthcoming), for example, have 
developed similar results. 
65 Of course, there are more important reasons why 3G is no longer thought as valuable as it once was (see 
Klemperer, 2002a). 
66 In this case, while a firm may raise prices against consumers who particularly value its product, in a 
competitive environment it will also lower prices to other consumers who like it less – and other firms will 
then have to respond. 
67 For example, the analysis shows that even though it may be no bad thing for consumers if different firms 
learn different pieces of information about them, the result depends on firms learning the same amount of 
information about any given consumer.  It probably is costly for a consumer to “lose his privacy” to only 
one firm, just as having asymmetrically informed bidders may be a bad thing for an auctioneer.  
Furthermore, even when firms learn the same amount of information about consumers’ tastes, this 
information may sometimes lead to inefficient price–discrimination which reduces total welfare, in which 
case consumers may be made worse off even though firms’ profits are lowered, just as inefficient auctions 
may be bad for both auctioneers and bidders.  Learning information may also affect firms’ abilities to 
collude, and the ease of new entry.  
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Bulow and Klemperer pursue these issues in the context of this specific 
application.  Klemperer (forthcoming) considers a range of other applications, including 
some that at first glance seem quite distant from auctions.  The moral is that the "received 
auction theory" is of great value in developing our understanding of practical issues.  But 
it needs to be used in conjunction with developing intuition and gathering empirical 





This paper is not attacking the value of economic theory.  I have argued that 
elementary economic theory is essential to successful economic policy. Furthermore, the 
methods of thinking that undergraduate economics teaches are very valuable, for 
example, in understanding the important distinction between Hong Kong's two 
superficially similar auction designs (the one proposed and the one actually 
implemented).  This essay has focused on examples from auctions, but the more I have 
been involved in public policy (for example, as a Member of the U.K. Competition 
Commission), the more I  have been impressed by the importance of elementary 
undergraduate economics. 
 
Nor is this paper intended as an attack on modern, or sophisticated, or graduate 
economics.  True, the emphasis of some graduate courses is misleading, and the relative 
importance of different parts of the theory is not always well-understood, but almost all 
of it is useful when appropriately applied; it is not true that all economic problems can be 
tackled using undergraduate economics alone.
68 
 
Policy errors are also less likely when expertise is not too narrowly focused in one 
subdiscipline  –  for example, auction designers should remember their industrial 
economics and political economy (at least) in addition to pure auction theory. 
 
While advanced theory can be misapplied, the correct answer is not to shy away 
from it, but rather to develop it further to bring in the important issues that have been 
omitted.  It may sometimes be true that “a little bit too much economics is a dangerous 
thing”, but it is surely also true that a great deal of economic knowledge is best of all.  
Moreover auction theory also illustrates that when a subdiscipline of economics becomes 
more widely used in practical policy making, its development becomes more heavily 
influenced by the practical problems that really matter.  Like a rapidly growing bush, 
theory may sometimes sprout and develop in unhelpful directions, but when pruned with 
the shears of practical experience it will quickly bear fruit!  
 
                                                                 
68 Furthermore, it is often only the process of thinking through the sophisticated graduate theory that puts 
the elementary undergraduate theory in proper perspective.  
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Furthermore, advanced economic theory is of practical importance in developing 
our economic understanding of the world, even when it cannot be directly applied to an 
immediate practical problem.  To recapitulate only the incomplete list of its merits that 
was illustrated by our example in section 6, it refutes over-simple arguments, makes 
precise and quantifies other arguments, allows us to see the relationship between 
superficially unconnected problems, organises our ideas, brings out the important features 
of problems, shows possibilities, and quickly develops general results which, even when 
they are not final answers, provide good starting points for further analysis.  
 
Nevertheless, the main lesson of this paper is that the blinkered use of economic 
theory can be dangerous.  Policy advisers need to learn from Marshall’s example to 
beware of the wider context, anticipate political pressures and, above all, remember that 
the most sophisticated theory may not be the most relevant.   
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